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A TRIAL LAWYER'S REFLECTIONS ON
ARBITRATING FRANCHISE DISPUTES
EDWARD WOOD DUN-IAM'
I begin with a declaration about perspective, because my
perspective on franchising and franchise law is, I believe, necessarily
different from those of the other participants in this Symposium. Some of
my fellow panelists are distinguished academics, like Sandy Meikeljohn
and Chris Drahozal, on the faculties of eminent law and business schools.
Matt Shay is the skillful leader of an influential trade association. Other
panelists are notable corporate lawyers with an elegant, intellectual
approach to structuring deals and assessing regulatory and relationship
issues. These include my good friend Rupert Barkoff, as well as Phil
Zeidman, arguably the country's pre-eminent franchise lawyer, who has
played a leading role in exporting franchise law to the world.
And then we have yours truly, the lone-and lonely-trial lawyer
in the bunch. What I do isfight with people. Most of my practice over the
last two decades has involved representing franchisors in disputes with
franchisees, area developers, development agents, vendors, and competing
franchisors. I have tried many lawsuits and arbitrations on behalf of
franchisors. I was even forced to develop a particular subspecialty in
litigation about arbitration, when my client, Doctor's Associates, the
Subway franchisor, was hit with a series of system-threatening
class actions and consolidated claims in certain county courthouses
reputedly inhospitable to large, out-of-state corporations.2 I am pleased to
report that we were able to use the franchise agreement arbitration clause to
stop those class actions and consolidated cases in their tracks, and compel
the franchisees to bring individual arbitrations in the contractually
designated venue. Those outcomes were not, however, self-executing.
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clients of his firm, or the Forum on Franchising.
2 See, e.g., We Care Hair Development v. Engen, 180 F.3d 838 (7th Cir. 1999);
Doctor's Associates, Inc. ("DAI") v. Hamilton, 150 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 1103 (1999); DAT v. Distajo, 107 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 948 (1997); DAI v. Stuart, 85 F.3d 975 (2d Cir. 1996); DAI v. Distajo,
66 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1120 (1996); Kroll v. DAI, 3 F.3d
1167 (7th Cir. 1993); DAI v. Hollingsworth, 949 F. Supp. 77 (D. Conn. 1996), aff'd,
No. 96-9599 (2d Cir. Feb. 5, 1998); DAI v. Keating, 72 Conn. App. 310 (Conn. App.
Ct. 2002); Bishop v. We Care Hair Development Corp., 738 N.E.2d 610 (111. App. Ct.
2000).
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They took a few sound tactical judgments,3 more than a little luck, a great
deal of our client's money, and rulings by many federal judges, including
numerous panels of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.
That whole, arduous process of getting claims into arbitration,
along with my experiences trying arbitrations, bench trials and jury trials,
has allowed me to consider, up close over an extended period of time,
arbitration's relative benefits and drawbacks as a dispute resolution
mechanism in franchise systems . In this article I want to share some
reflections on this subject - not from a theoretical or academic perspective,
but from my vantage point as an occasionally bruised and bloodied
combatant.
I. REFLECTION #1 -ARBITRATION IS ARBITRARY
6
To understand arbitration, and appropriately calibrate expectations
about what the process holds in store, it is important to remember one
illuminating etymological fact: "Arbitrate" and "arbitrary" share the same
Latin root, the noun "arbiter," which refers to a person who mediates a
3 For a discussion of the process involved in compelling arbitration under the Federal
Arbitration Act and related tactical considerations, see Mark R. Kravitz and Edward
Wood Dunham, Compelling Arbitration, 23 LITIG 34 (1996).
4 See, e.g., We Care Hair Development v. Engen, 180 F.3d 838 (7th Cir. 1999);
Doctor's Associates, Inc. ("DAI") v. Hamilton, 150 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 1103 (1999); DAI v. Distajo, 107 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 948 (1997); DAI v. Stuart, 85 F.3d 975 (2d Cir. 1996); DAI v. Distajo,
66 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1120 (1996); Kroll v. DAI, 3 F.3d
1167 (7th Cir. 1993); DAI v. Hollingsworth, 949 F. Supp. 77 (D. Conn. 1996), affid,
No. 96-9599 (2d Cir. Feb. 5, 1998); DAI v. Keating, 72 Conn. App. 310 (Conn. App.
Ct. 2002); Bishop v. We Care Hair Development Corp., 738 N.E.2d 610 (11. App. Ct.
2000).
5 This is a subject that I have been contemplating, and writing about, for many years.
See, e.g., Edward Wood Dunham & Erika P. Amarante, DAI v. Downey: Associational
Standing and Arbitration, 27 FRANCHISE L.J. 16 (2007); Edward Wood Dunham, et al,
Franchisor Attempts to Control the Dispute Resolution Forum: Why the Federal
Arbitration Act Trumps the New Jersey Supreme Court's Decision in Kubis, 29
RUTGERS L.J. 237 (1998); Edward Wood Dunham, The Arbitration Clause as Class
Action Shield, 16 FRANCHISE L.J. 141 (1997), reprinted in BEST OF ABA SECTIONS,
Spring 1998 at 36.
6 Portions of the next two sections of this article are adapted from material that Mr.
Dunham wrote for a paper that he and Michael J. Lockerby presented at the 2005
annual meeting of the American Bar Association Forum on Franchising, in a workshop
entitled "Shall We Arbitrate? The Pros and Cons of Arbitrating Franchise Disputes."
See Edward Wood Dunham and Michael J. Lockerby, Shall We Arbitrate? The Pros
and Cons of Arbitrating Franchise Disputes, 28 h A.B.A. Forum on Franchising § L3 at
4-5. Mr. Dunham extends his thanks to Mr. Lockerby for his editorial comments on this
material and for his insights into the subject of franchise arbitration.
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dispute.7 It also pays to remember that arbitration developed, and still
exists, as an alternative to, not an imitation of, the lawsuit. Accordingly,
compared to litigation, there may always be a somewhat arbitrary quality to
arbitration's procedures and fidelity to governing law. Most arbitrators pay
no regard at all to evidentiary rules. Many arbitrators see their mission as
imposing equitable solutions, with equity measured by entirely personal,
subjective and undisclosed yardsticks, not objective standards explicated in
published case law as it has developed over the centuries. And while
arbitration awards are nominally subject to judicial review, in the
overwhelming majority of cases that review consists of wielding a rubber
stamp, no matter how contrary to law, downright goofy, or just plain
arbitrary the award might be.
Sounds pretty bad, right? True enough, but whatever arbitration's
flaws may be-and they are many-litigation is no prize either.
II. REFLECTION # 2 - LITIGATION MAY BE EVEN WORSE
In fact, at least for franchisors, the real case for arbitration may boil
down to this: litigation could be even worse. As another practitioner and I
have observed elsewhere, "American litigation is untidy, expensive, time-
consuming, wildly unpredictable, fraught with risk, and conducted in a
broad variety of judicial systems involving disparate rules, judicial quality
and juror attitudes. Any franchisor contemplating national expansion-or
even units in multiple states-should understand what litigation in these
diverse judicial systems can actually involve before concluding that it
would rather litigate than arbitrate." 
8
If I could always guarantee a bench trial in federal court, I might
never consider arbitration. The federal courts are certainly not perfect, but
for businesses confronting litigation, the obvious merits of the federal
judicial system include the high quality of the judges, appointed for life and
therefore largely immune to untoward influence; an ample supply of smart
law clerks to help those judges get it right; sensible procedural and
evidentiary rules that are consistently applied; and meaningful review by
appellate courts full of many extraordinarily talented jurists.9
But franchisors cannot always secure federal jurisdiction. Most
claims in cases brought by franchisees and other parties that sue franchisors
involve no questions of federal law. And in my experience, if a plaintiff
really wants to defeat diversity jurisdiction, it often is not that difficult to
identify and add a plausible local defendant, such as an employee or agent
of the franchisor or another local franchisee.
7 The Oxford English Dictionary Online, http://dictionary.oed.com/ (definition for
"arbiter") (last visited Mar. 3, 2009).
8 Dunham & Lockerby, supra note 5.
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As for state courts, I offer some statistics that always startle me:
there are over 4,400 state trial courts in the United States, and about 72% of
state court trial judges are elected.' 0 An additional nine per cent are subject,
at some point during their tenures, to a popular retention vote. Fifty-three
per cent of state court appellate judges are elected, and another 26% are
subject to popular retention votes." Obviously, many of these state court
judges are terrific-every bit as good as their federal counterparts. Some of
my fondest professional memories involve smart, gutsy trial and appellate
judges in Chris Drahozal's home state of Kansas.' 2 But it is sometimes
hard to shake the fear that in certain jurisdictions, judges elected with the
help of campaign contributions from the local plaintiffs' bar will not be
very fond of out-of-state corporations, and that fair treatment will prove
illusive.
13
This may seem like the paranoia of an anti-populist and provincial
Easterner, from a state whose judges are all appointed by the Governor after
being cleared by a merit selection panel. But this is not just my fevered
imagination. In the immortal words of former Justice Richard Neely of the
West Virginia Supreme Court, "As long as I am allowed to redistribute
wealth from out-of-state companies to injured in-state plaintiffs, I shall
continue to do so. Not only is my sleep enhanced when I give someone
else's money away, so is my job security."' 14
Now, that may simply have been an example of judicial humor, but
we have also seen news accounts in recent years about questionable
behavior by another West Virginia Supreme Court Justice, socializing-in
Monte Carlo, no less-with the CEO of a large mining company that was a
party to a case before the court.15 And I certainly do not mean to be a rude
guest, but The New York Times published a story in October 2006 about
Justices of the Ohio Supreme Court accepting campaign contributions from
the political action committees of companies that were parties to appeals
before the court, and then joining majority decisions in favor of those
companies.16
10 Data compiled by Wiggin and Dana's Information Center, from THE AMERICAN
BENCH: JUDGES OF THE NATION (16th ed. 2006) and THE SOURCEBOOK To PUBLIC
RECORD INFORMATION (9th ed. 2008).
l1 Id
12 Subway Restaurants, Inc. v. Kessler, 970 P.2d 526 (Kan. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 1756 (1999).
13 See, e.g., American Tort Reform Association, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES (2007), available
at http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes, (last visited Mar. 3, 2009).
14 RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESS: How BUSINESS CAN BE RESCUED
FROM THE POLITICS OF STATE COURTS 4 (1988).
15 Len Boselovic, W. Va. Chief Justice Accused of Bias, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,
Jan. 15, 2008 at Al.
16 Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court's Ruling, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, at 1.
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Most people do not like to admit it, especially in public, but if you
represent an out-of-state franchisor in a dispute with a local franchisee,
these news items, and the whole practice of judges receiving campaign
contributions in contested elections, does not instill confidence that your
client will be treated fairly by the state judiciary in certain jurisdictions. At
least with arbitrators, both sides share the cost and the economics of the
relationship are transparent.
Of course, arbitration clauses are not the only contract provisions
that franchisors employ in their efforts to specify forums and manage risk.
Judicial forum selection clauses, jury trial waivers, damage caps and
punitive damage waivers can all be extremely effective tools if a court will
enforce them.17  But in all probability, no franchisor doing business
nationwide will ever achieve uniform enforcement of such contract terms.
Certain states have passed legislation expressly prohibiting enforcement of
these franchise agreement provisions,' 8 and in most jurisdictions, state and
federal, their enforcement will depend upon application of complicated,
multi-part tests that involve several subjective factors, susceptible to highly
variable judicial construction. 19
In sharp contrast, there is a federal statute whose sole purpose is to
ensure enforcement of agreements to arbitrate in accordance with their
terms. Space does not permit either a detailed exegesis of the Federal
Arbitration Act, 20 or discussion of the recent, misguided proposals before
Congress that would ban pre-dispute, franchise agreement arbitration
17 Dunham & Lockerby, supra note 5, at 6-7.
18 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 482.3638 (West 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-
7.2 (West 2001); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1560 (2004); W. VA. CODE R. § 47-11C-
3 (2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 32-6B-49.1 (2004); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 650.165
(West 2003); VA. CODE ANN. §59.1-21.11 (West 2004); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF.LAW §
463(x) (McKinney 2005). Certain state statutes also bar franchise agreement clauses
choosing another state's laws to govern the parties' relationship. See, e.g., WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 553.76 (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 4917(2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-
1-624 (West 2004); HAW. REV. STAT. § 482E-6 (2003); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 49-1632
(West 2004); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 705/41 (West 204); IOWA CODE ANN. §
323.13 (West 2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.1527 (West 2002); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 80C.21 (West 2005); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 392.300 (West 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 20-308.2 (West 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-21.11 (West 2004); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 31-16-124 (West 2003). It appears that even more states have statutes
invalidating forum selection clauses. Benjamin A. Levin and Richard S. Morrison,
Kubis and the Changing Landscape of Forum Selection Clauses, 16 FRANCHISE L.J. 97,
116 (1997) ("California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and South Dakota
all have statutes, rules, or policies which regulate where franchise related litigation
and/or arbitration may occur.").
19 Edward Wood Dunham, Enforcing Contract Terms Designed to Manage Franchisor
Risk, 19 FRANCHISE L.J. 91, 97 (2000).
20 9. U.S.C. §§ 1.
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clauses.21 Suffice, for now, to say that under the current state of the law, if
a franchisor wants to achieve the predictability that comes from uniform
enforcement of its risk management contract provisions, the arbitration
clause is easily the best option.
I have managed to get this far with barely a mention of one of the
most significant factors in assessing the relative merits of arbitrating
franchise disputes: the jury. For any trial lawyer worth his or her salt, "jury
trials are the ultimate expression of the lawyer's art and craft. An intimate
stage, a live audience, no second takes available-the trial lawyer is the
producer, director, occasional bit player and sometimes star of a play with
no fixed script and an ending entirely unknown until the jury knocks on the
door and returns to the box to deliver its news.,
22
It is so much fun! But for clients-especially corporate
defendants-jury trials are more often than not quite anxiety-provoking,
and sometimes simply terrifying. It is now widely recognized that jury
trials are an increasingly rare phenomenon in American civil litigation, and
franchise cases are no exception. (The vanishing trial is a subject, already
much discussed and written about, for a different symposium.).2 3 Some
cases are won by motion. The vast majority settle. There is always the
chance, however, that your client's case will be the statistical exception and
the prospect of trial before a jury of your client's "peers" can induce
settlement at numbers far larger than would be paid if the jury were not
looming as the audience and decisionmaker. The possibility of trial by jury
in one of the aforementioned county courthouses is an especially bracing
reminder that arbitration, for all its warts, may not be so bad after all.
III. REFLECTION # 3 - PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND CLASS ACTIONS
Every sensible franchisor wants to avoid punitive damage claims
and class actions. On the latter subject, I defer to Professor Drahozal,
except to say this: I used to believe that an arbitration clause was an
impregnable class action shield, and that this was the trump argument in
favor of arbitration. 24 But given recent developments in the law, including
the Supreme Court's decision in Green Tree Financial v. Bazzle25 and the
passage of the Class Action Fairness Act,26 the relative merits of litigation
21 Arbitration Fairness Act, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 3010, 110th Cong.
(2007).
22 Edward Wood Dunham, A Rare But Scary Thing: More on Franchise Jury Trials, 21
FRANCHISE L.J. 179 (2002).
23 Symposium, The Vanishing Trial, JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES, Nov.
2004, at v.
24 Edward Wood Dunham, The Arbitration Clause as Class Action Shield, 16
FRANCHISE L.J. 141 (1997).
25 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
26 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 119 Stat. 4-14 (2005).
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and arbitration in fending off class claims may well have shifted, although a
carefully drafted arbitration clause that expressly prohibits consolidated or
class claims still ought to work.
As for punitive damages, arbitration is a decidedly mixed bag. On
the one hand, if the arbitration clause expressly provides that the arbitrator
has no power to award punitive damages, that provision should be binding.
(If the arbitrator were to ignore that limit on his power, this would probably
be one of those rare occasions when a court would actually scrutinize and
overturn an award). On the other hand, if there is no such contractual limit
on the arbitrator's authority, the prevailing judicial view is that there are
also no legal limits on the arbitrator's power to award any amount of
punitive damages he sees fit, no matter how disproportionate they may be
to the compensatory damage award. So far, most courts that have
considered the question have held that BMW v. Gore27 and the other
Supreme Court decisions establishing constitutional limits on punitive
damages in litigation 28 have no application at all to arbitration, 29
notwithstanding the obvious state action when a court enters an order
enforcing an arbitration award, thereby turning it into a judgment subject to
the same enforcement powers as judgments following bench and jury
trials.
30
IV. REFLECTION #4 - IN ARBITRATION, You HAVE A ROLE IN
PICKING THE DECISIONMAKER AND OTHERWISE SHAPING
THE PROCEEDINGS
When all is said and done, whether arbitration is preferable to
litigation as the dispute resolution mechanism for franchise systems may
depend more than anything else upon just one thing: the quality of the
arbitrators. Taking full advantage of the relative informality and flexibility
that arbitration provides, a talented arbitrator can limit discovery, conduct
efficient hearings and promptly produce a sensible award, all at costs far
27 BMW of North. America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
28 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416
(2003).
29 Davis v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1189 (11 th Cir. 1995); Morgan
Keegan & Co., v. Lalonde, No. Civ. A.00-2520, 2001 WL 43600 (E.D. La. Jan. 16,
2001); Mantle v. Upper Deck Co., 956 F. Supp. 719, 723-35 (N.D. Tex. 1997);
MedvalUSA Health Programs, Inc. v. Memberworks, Inc., 872 A.2d 423, 427 (Conn.
2005); Hadelman v. DeLuca, 274 Conn. 442, 447-9 (Conn. 2005). Mr. Dunham's firm
represented the Memberworks and Hadelman appellants before the Connecticut
Supreme Court, and Mr. Dunham represented the Hadelman appellants, including the
Subway franchisor Doctor's Associates, in the underlying arbitration and the initial
challenge to the arbitration award.
30 Edward Wood Dunham, Applying Constitutional Limits on Punitive Damages to
Franchise Disputes, 22 FRANCHISE L.J. 203 (2003).
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lower than litigation of the same dispute would inevitably generate. Those
are the supposed benefits of arbitration, and they can in fact be realized.
They also can in fact bear no relationship whatsoever to the reality
of arbitration, if a panel of three arbitrators without much else to do decides
to let every stitch of paper into evidence, compete with each other in
demonstrating their withering cross-examination techniques and inspiring
speechmaking abilities, and allow the lawyers to wander into whatever
areas they choose, relevant or not. I once tried a franchise arbitration that
could and should have taken at most 10 days of evidence, which instead
metastasized into more than 40 days of hearings, spread out over five years.
An advertisement for the arbitral process this was not.
The lesson is that franchisors need to be sensible and informed
when they draft arbitration clauses. The ADR provider should be chosen
not by habit or reflex, but with actual information about the quality of
potential arbitrator pools. Likewise, there should be conscious, informed
decisions, based upon assessments of relative risks and costs, about whether
to have one arbitrator or three, and if the answer is three, whether the extra
two arbitrators should be party-appointed advocates or additional neutrals.
One of arbitration's principal virtues is that it never has to be an
off-the-rack experience. (By this I do not mean to suggest that franchisors
should get creative by drafting complicated, one-sided arbitration clauses
that offend courts and make them search for reasons not to enforce. We
have seen some judicial pushback against arbitration in recent years, at least
some of which is a product of overreaching by the drafters of the arbitration
clauses at issue). My point is a practical one: even after the arbitration
clause has been written and the franchise agreement containing it has been
signed, the arbitration can be custom-tailored as a result of further
negotiation between the parties to a particular dispute-to cite a few
examples, by changing the contractually designated venue, shrinking from
three arbitrators down to one, requiring application of the rules of evidence,
or imposing limits on the length of the hearing. If parties to an arbitration
agreement genuinely want to attain arbitration's benefits and avoid its
pitfalls, they can keep working at that, and improve their odds of success
throughout the process, to an extent that litigation can never permit.
Thus ends my brief dispatch from the battlefield. I make no claims
that my opinions are anywhere close to universally held. Quite the
contrary: a poll of experienced franchise lawyers and franchisor executives
concerning arbitration would yield a wide scatter of opinion. Some swear
by it, others loath it, and others are somewhere between those polls, having
concluded that-on balance-a sensibly drafted, prudently enforced
arbitration clause is probably still preferable to the vicissitudes of litigation.
Whether arbitration makes sense for a particular franchise system
is, in significant measure, a function of many factors specific to that system.
But for every franchise system, the first response to this question should
always be another question-compared to what? The comparison must be
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to litigation, not as we learn about it in casebooks at fine institutions like
the Moritz College of Law at The Ohio State University, but as it exists out
there in the messy, unpredictable real world.
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